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DEFENDING A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION 
USING THE CHARITABLE IMMUNITY AND 
ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE DEFENSES TO 
TORT LIABILITY 
Michael M. Harrison 
 
Defense attorneys in Arkansas are, not infrequently, called 
upon to defend religious institutions from tort suits brought 
against them for a variety of reasons.  Such claims may arise out 
of a motor vehicle accident involving a church bus, a slip and fall 
accident on church premises, a claim of sexual molestation on the 
part of a church employee, or another type of claim.  In defending 
claims against religious institutions, it is imperative that the 
defense of charitable immunity and, where applicable, the 
Ecclesiastical doctrine, be raised in the first responsive pleading 
to the Complaint, be that an Answer and/or a Motion to 
Dismiss.  As such, defense counsel should plead in the Answer, 
among other affirmative defenses, Arkansas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 
12(b)(6) failure to state a claim sufficient to form the basis for 
relief.  He or she should also affirmatively plead the client’s not-
for-profit entity status, citing its Internal Revenue Service 
501(c)(3) designation.  Furthermore, defense counsel should raise 
the defense that the claim violates the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the separation of church and state 
doctrine.1  Essentially, this argument is that a secular civil court 
 
            Michael McCarty Harrison is a partner at Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP in the 
firm’s Litigation Practice Group.  She focuses her practice on insurance defense and 
coverage, products liability, medical malpractice, personal injury defense, transportation 
litigation, fire/arson investigation and defense and appellate advocacy. Prior to joining the 
firm, Harrison spent 20 years developing a strong litigation practice in Little Rock and has 
been recognized for her work by Mid-South Super Lawyers. She is a member of the 
Defense Research Institute and the Arkansas Association of Defense Counsel, of which she 
served as past president. 
1. See Belin v. West, 315 Ark. 61, 864 S.W.2d 838 (1993); Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 
371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988); Arkansas Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church 
v. Hudson, 344 Ark. 332, 40 S.W.3d 301 (2001). 
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lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine and/or interpret 
church doctrine.   
Under Arkansas law, charitable not-for-profit organizations 
are immune from tort liability under the well-established doctrine 
of charitable immunity.2  The purpose of the “charitable-
immunity doctrine is that organizations such as agencies and 
trusts created and maintained exclusively for charity may not 
have their assets diminished by execution in favor of one injured 
by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or 
trust.”3  In Low v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., the Arkansas Supreme 
Court held that based upon the express language of the direct-
action statute, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-210, a 
charitable organization is immune from both tort liability and suit 
against it.4  Arkansas courts have consistently interpreted the 
statutory language, “immunity from liability in tort,” to constitute 
immunity from suit.5   
Typically, a Motion for Summary Judgment is needed in 
order to prove to the court that the client is a not-for-profit or 
religious institution and is therefore entitled to immunity from 
both tort liability and suit.  In order to obtain a dismissal, exhibits 
will be necessary to prove the same.  In determining whether an 
entity is charitable and, therefore, entitled to charitable immunity, 
Arkansas courts consider several factors, including: 
(1) whether the organization’s charter limits it to charitable 
or eleemosynary purposes; (2) whether the organization’s 
charter contains a “not-for-profit” limitation; (3) whether the 
organization’s goal is to break even; (4) whether the 
organization earned a profit; (5) whether any profit or 
surplus [the entity earns] must be used for charitable or 
eleemosynary purposes; (6) whether the organization 
depends on contributions and donations for its existence; (7) 
whether the organization provides its service[s] free of 
charge to those unable to pay; and (8) whether the directors 
 
2. See Jackson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 533, 294 S.W.3d 1 (2009).  
3. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d 457, 460. 
4. 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005). 
5. See Ramsey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 234 Ark. 1031, 356 S.W.2d 236 (1962); Williams 
v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969); Harvill v. Cmty. Methodist 
Hosp. Ass’n, 302 Ark. 39, 786 S.W.2d 577 (1990); Jarboe v. Shelter Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 395, 
877 S.W.2d 930 (1994); George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 
(1999); Smith v. Rogers Grp., Inc., 348 Ark. 241, 72 S.W.3d 450 (2002). 
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and officers of the organization receive compensation [for 
their services to the organization].6 
However, this list is “illustrative, not exhaustive, and no single 
factor is dispositive of charitable status.”7   
In examining the first and second factors of the eight-factor 
test, one must look at the charitable entity’s Charter and/or 
Articles of Incorporation.  Typically, such documents contain 
language limiting the organization to act only for charitable 
purposes or include a not-for-profit limitation on its actions, or 
both.8  Some also include language to the effect that the 
organization is organized for “purposes that qualify as tax exempt 
under current sections of the Internal Revenue Code.”9  Others 
provide that the organization is limited “exclusively for 
charitable, civic, social, cultural, and educational purposes.”10  
All such language is sufficient to satisfy factors one and 
two.  However, some language allows the organization to 
“engage in all purposes . . . permitted by applicable law.”11  This 
is not a fatal flaw, as the Arkansas Supreme Court has explained, 
“[t]he first and second [factors] are perhaps the easiest of the 
 
6. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d at 460-61 (quoting Masterson v. Stambuck, 
321 Ark. 391, 401, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995)).  
7. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 6, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (citing Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902 
S.W.2d at 810).  
8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Suggested Language for Corporations and 
Associations (per publication 557), IRS (Feb. 2, 2021), [https://perma.cc/93FW-CCRP]; see, 
e.g., Neal v. Davis Nursing Ass’n, 2015 Ark. App. 478, at 4, 470 S.W.3d 281, 283 (holding 
that it was “undisputed that Davis satisfies factors 1, 2, and 8” because “Davis’s charter limits 
its operation to charitable purposes and contains a not-for-profit limitation”); see also 
Progressive Eldercare Services-Saline, Inc. v. Krauss, 2014 Ark. App. 265, at 3, 2014 WL 
1758914, at *2 (holding that “[s]ome factors presented to the court would favor entitlement 
to charitable immunity” because “Progressive’s charter limits it to charitable or 
eleemosynary purposes, the charter contains a ‘not-for-profit’ limitation, and its directors 
and officers do not receive compensation”). 
9. See, e.g., Gain, Inc. v. Martin, 2016 Ark. App. 157, at 4, 485 S.W.3d 729, 732 
(holding that “[t]he first and second factors [were] established by Gain’s articles of 
incorporation, which provide that Gain is a public-benefit corporation under the Arkansas 
Nonprofit Act of 1993” and declaring that Gain uses “any funds ‘for charitable and 
educational purposes as a nonprofit corporation’”). 
10. See St. Bernard’s Cmty. Hosp. Corp. v. Chaney, 2021 Ark. App. 236, at 9, 2021 
WL 1900046, at *5 (stating that “CrossRidge’s articles of incorporation provide that 
CrossRidge is a corporation organized ‘exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, and 
educational purposes’”). 
11. See Rohrscheib v. Barton-Lexa Water Ass’n, 246 Ark. 145, 148, 437 S.W.2d 230, 
232 (1969) (opining that the language of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64—1904 “provides that these 
non-profit corporations may be organized under the act for any lawful purpose or purposes”).  
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factors to demonstrate as they are merely a matter of possessing 
corporate documentation reflecting nonprofit and charitable 
character.”12  In other words, as long as the documents establish 
the organization was created for not-for-profit and/or charitable 
pursuits, it will pass muster, notwithstanding language allowing 
it to engage in other endeavors.  
Such documentation should be obtainable from the client 
itself.  However, if for some reason the client is unable to provide 
the documents, they are easily obtainable from the Arkansas 
Secretary of State’s office, as the organization would have had to 
file the documents when it was established.13  If the 
organization’s purposes have changed over the years, there may 
be more than one Charter and/or Articles of Incorporation, and all 
must be reviewed to ascertain if, in fact, the appropriate language 
is still in place and the organization’s primary purpose at the time 
of the accident or incident giving rise to the cause of action was 
for charitable endeavors.   
The third through eighth factors are typically proven by 
affidavit of the organization’s chief executive or chief financial 
officer and will need to include testimony that the organization 
seeks simply to “break even and not to earn a profit.”14  The 
affiant should also attest that if there is a profit, “all proceeds 
received in excess of its operating costs” are invested back into 
the organization for further, future charitable purposes.15   
The same analysis applies to the fifth factor about “whether 
any profit or surplus must be used for charitable or eleemosynary 
purposes.”16  This “factor examines what an entity that does 
produce a surplus actually does with it.”17  Thus, a charitable 
organization can earn a profit, “so long as the money thus 
received is devoted altogether to the charitable object which the 
institution is intended to further.”18   
 
12. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 337 Ark. 206, 212, 987 S.W.2d 710, 713 (1999). 
13. See ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE, Doing Business in Arkansas 8 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/FV6H-K88H]. 
14. See generally George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 713.   
15. See, e.g., id. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 713-14.  
16. Davis Nursing Ass’n v. Neal, 2019 Ark. 91, at 5, 570 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting 
Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 401, 902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995)). 
17. George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 714.  
18. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.   
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Most modern not-for-profit organizations do not rely 
entirely on contributions and donations, which Arkansas law has 
recognized in examining factor six.  As explained by George v. 
Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, while depending only on donations would 
make “an even clearer case of charitable immunity,” the proof of 
an organization’s “organizational structure as presented do[es] 
not negate its overriding charitable purpose.”19  In further 
explanation, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held: 
In considering the sixth factor, we note that Sparks does not 
depend solely on contributions and donations for its 
existence.  Most of its operating funds are provided through 
Medicare, Medicaid, and individual patients or their private 
insurers.  While the nonprofit hospital in George only 
received donations totaling approximately 6% of its financial 
obligations, this court stated that ”a modern hospital, 
with rare exception, would find it extremely difficult to 
operate wholly or predominately on charitable 
donations.” As was the case in George, the fact that 
Sparks receives most of its funding through sources other 
than contributions or donations does not “negate its 
overriding charitable purpose.”20 
The client may well primarily rely upon federal grants, state 
grants, Medicare payments, and/or private insurance payments 
for services rendered.  However, such contributions or donations 
are likely tax-deductible and, therefore, do not jeopardize the 
organization’s charitable status.21  Thus, it is vital to secure an 
affidavit attesting to the overriding charitable purpose of the 
organization and how contributions or donations to it are 
implemented for those purposes.  The affiant should be an 
individual with knowledge of the organization’s activities.  For 
instance, testimony in the affidavit that any proceeds received in 
excess of the organization’s “operating costs are returned to the 
organization to acquire, renovate, and operate its organization and 
further its charitable purposes” covers all the bases.22   
 
19. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.  
20. Jackson v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 533, 541, 294 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (2009) 
(emphasis added) (citing George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 710). 
21. See Jackson, 375 Ark. at 541, 294 S.W.3d at 6.  
22. See Neal v. Davis Nursing Ass’n, 2015 Ark. App. 478, at 5, 470 S.W.3d 281, 284 
(stating that “Davis’s bylaws require that its board members and officers serve without pay” 
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Finally, regarding factor eight, which is “whether the 
directors and officers receive compensation,” the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has ruled “it is not necessary for a charitable 
organization to have entirely volunteer staff and 
management.”23  Instead, Arkansas law permits a not-for-profit 
organization’s executives to earn a salary so as to attract well-
qualified individuals to these offices.24  Arkansas courts have 
explained for factor eight: 
[I]t is not necessary for charitable organizations to have 
entirely volunteer staff and management.  [The hospital’s] 
size and complexity make knowledgeable, well-qualified 
personnel essential.  Such persons do not readily volunteer 
their services or serve at rates of compensation markedly 
lower than market rates.25  
In George, although the charitable entity’s chief executive 
officer and chief financial officer both received a yearly salary of 
$225,000 and $170,000, respectively, and had a potential bonus 
compensation available to them, the court held that these facts did 
“not put the hospital in the position of being maintained for the 
private gain, profit, or advantage of its organizers.”26  A Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supported by the organization’s Charter 
and/or Articles of Incorporation, and an affidavit from a chief 
executive of the organization addressing each of the above-
referenced eight factors, should position the client well for a 
speedy dismissal based upon the charitable immunity doctrine.  
With regard to religious institutions, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that civil courts do not have 
jurisdiction to interpret or implement church doctrine.27  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court agrees.28  In Gipson v. Brown, the court 
 
and “Davis contends that any profits earned would be held and reinvested in its continued 
operation”). 
23. See George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added). 
24. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714; Scamardo v. Sparks Reg’l Med. Ctr., 375 Ark. 300, 
308, 289 S.W.3d 903, 908 (2008) (finding compensation permissible when the top three 
executives earned more than $230,000 per year and the chief executive officer earned 
$350,000 per year). 
25. George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added). 
26. Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.  
27. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 694 
(1976).  
28. See Ark. Presbytery of Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, 344 Ark. 332, 
40 S.W.3d 301 (2001). 
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noted the Ecclesiastical doctrine’s intent and purpose and found, 
absent fraud or collusion, the United States Supreme Court has 
held since 1872:  
that when civil courts get involved in matters of church 
discipline or ecclesiastical government, it requires looking 
into the customs, usages, written laws, and the fundamental 
organization of religious denominations, which deprives 
these bodies of the right to interpret their own church laws 
and opens the door to all sorts of evils.29   
The court in Gipson went on to state “deference [must be given] 
to decisions of ecclesiastical bodies on matters of internal church 
governance.”30  
In the Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. Archbishop decision, Justice 
Brandeis, writing for the majority, stated, “[i]n the absence of 
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper 
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although 
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular 
court as conclusive.”31  Similarly, in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme 
Court held that when religious institutions establish rules for 
internal governance, “the Constitution requires that civil courts 
accept their decisions as binding upon them.”32  Further, the 
Supreme Court has held religious freedom encompasses the 
power of religious bodies to “decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church governnment as well as those 
of faith and doctrine.”33  
In many instances, for a circuit court to find a duty owed by 
and/or liability on the part of a religious institution, it would, 
necessarily, first need to interpret, and thereby pass judgment 
upon, the structure and organization of the entity’s internal faith 
and doctrine.  This is especially true in cases involving alleged 
misconduct of a church employee and even more so if there are 
allegations of negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention of an 
employee.  It is clear from the above holdings that to do so would 
 
29. Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 376, 749 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1988) (citing Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872)).  
30. Gipson, 295 Ark. at 376, 749 S.W.2d at 299 (citing Gonzalez v. Roman Cath. 
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)). 
31. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. 
32. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 619 (1979) (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25) 
(emphasis added). 
33. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).   
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be contrary to constitutional law.  However, an early-filed Motion 
to Dismiss asserting the Ecclesiastical doctrine should lead to a 
dismissal of the suit in its entirety, or at least those causes of 
action requiring interpretation of church structure and 
management.   
In conclusion, the charitable immunity and Ecclesiastical 
doctrine defenses are useful tools in a defense counsel’s arsenal 
when defending a religious institution client.  When plead 
promptly and supported by the proper documentation and 
affidavit evidence, either or both should result in a dismissal of 
the entity without protracted litigation or costs being incurred.   
 
 
